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Abstract  In this paper, we take the approach of the lexicon makers: We contemplate human language instead of trying to 
resist its forces. Basically, some sigmatoids seem to have been created to be free of boundaries: We fence them as we please 
when we apply them to our assertions, but they are quite vague in the lexicon. We here identify at least two types of such 
sigmatoids: The synthetisers and the specifiers. The former would originate from our capacity of isolating common features 
of objects that, in principle, have no possible intersection. The latter would originate from our attempt of describing the 3D 
World by means of 2D entities. We conclude that the intrinsic vagueness of these sigmatoids is something not only acceptable, 
but either pleasant or necessary.  
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1. Introduction 
Haack (1998) brought the following passage to our 
attention: 
 
We then get to know that people like Quine (Hylton, 2014) 
worried about how to make our audience or readership select 
exactly the Socrates they have in their Inner Reality 
(Pinheiro, 2016) when they attempt to communicate with 
them.  
The extract offers two options: The teacher of Plato and 
Socrates. The problem with the former is that Plato probably 
had more teachers, like Socrates was not the only one, so that 
the expression The Teacher of Plato does not make the 
person who listens to that pick exclusively the Socrates that 
Quine had in his mind. The problem with saying Socrates is 
that there are plenty of people called Socrates, so that we are 
not guaranteeing that the person who listens to us will pick 
exactly the Socrates we have in our Inner Reality as we say 
that. 
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The extract says that the just-mentioned ways to refer to 
Socrates are definite descriptions. It also says that they both 
denote the same thing.  
Definite would have the sense of exact according to the 




1. clearly defined; exact; explicit 
2. having precise limits or boundaries 
3. known for certain; sure: it is definite that they 
havewon. 
4. (Botany) botany 
a. denoting a type of growth in which the mainstem 
ends in a flower, as in a cymose inflorescence; 
determinate 
b. (esp of flower parts) limited or fixed in numberin a 
given species 
Exact, both of them are not, as we have already pointed 
out. 
We also have already pointed out that they don’t point at 
the same thing, since one could pick a Socrates from 2016, 
one who is alive, and the other could pick Plato’s 
Mathematics teacher instead.  
For us to be able to guarantee that the reader or listener 
will pick precisely the Socrates we have in our Inner Reality 
when reading what we wrote, we have to do way more than 
describing a function of the person we refer to as we produce 
an assertion involving them. 
In this paper, we attempt to discuss this idea. 




These issues are indeed hard: We want to find completely 
logical ways of referring to assertions that, on their turn, refer 
to human beings. 
Regardless of which option we choose, our names or our 
functions, we are pointing at something that is abstract even 
for ourselves, for human beings are also soul or we conform 
better, and therefore feel that things are being better 
explained, when we say that we are body and soul. 
We are therefore something a bit blurred even for 
ourselves: Sometimes we feel as if we are made of only 
matter, and that happens when, for instance, we feel really 
cold and even die from that. Sometimes we feel as if we are 
only spirit, and that happens when we become quadriplegic 
or when we are suffering atrocities 24/7, perhaps in full 
slavery. 
In not being matter, and in still being something that 
seems to be superior to it, it would be unlikely that we could 
refer to what we are by means of using matter in a perfect 
manner, and our letters are matter. 
We are not our names, and, in special, we will never be our 
first names: We don’t have any original identification with 
those. Our parents, more than likely, are those who chose 
those names. We learn from them repeating over and over 
that they mean us when they say that name. 
We die and our life becomes that name. Notwithstanding, 
we are not together with that name anymore when our life 
becomes it, as ironic as it may seem. 
What is in discussion in this passage is therefore more than 
what our eyes can see: What could perfectly represent our 
being in a piece of paper? 
This is like trying to fit our 3D world in an A4 sheet: We 
have decided that this attempt does not lead to a perfect 
expression of the 3D world because it is still 2D. We do a 
pretty good job with the computer screens, and they seem to 
be 2D, but reality is that we play a game of lights and 
everything else to create those effects that seem to change 
things into 3D. We can then go very close to doing that, but 
we will always know the difference between a computer or a 
screen image, say a Hollywoodian movie, and reality, we 
reckon. 
In this case, referring to a human being called Socrates as 
the teacher of Plato or Socrates would be pointing at this 
human being in an imperfect manner. We would need at least 
a vector, as in the computer or screen image, to make that 
more palatable, so say (teacher of Plato, Socrates, 
philosopher, male, son of X and Y, born in SSSS). It is as if 
our language is 2D, just like our screen, and the way our 
mind gets to that particular Socrates is multi D instead. We 
are obviously after an infallible handle here. 
Of course, our Science has already solved the problem, 
like everyone has accepted that DNAs tell exactly who we 
are, so that we could have (Socrates, number 123 in the NDD, 
Australia), where NDD is National Database of DNAs. 
The only problem is that this is the same as Hyde wanted 
to do with our language: Oh, the numberphiles [(Pinheiro, 
2015) and (Pinheiro, 2016a)], do you remember? Now we 
could perhaps have the vectorphiles or something like that. 
Once more, we have to deal with things and people as they 
come to us, basically, like we don’t change them, so that we 
can refer to them in our discourse. We are obliged to point at 
the world object at the present moment, not after we finish 
changing it. 
We are not going to spend 10 days breaking every bone of 
Hyde to make him fit in a box that we can carry if we want to 
tell Priest about Hyde today, basically, even if we could 
accept breaking his every bone to make him fit in our box. 
We need to tell something about Hyde to Priest today, on the 
21st of September of 2016, right now, so that we have to deal 
with that as it is. Once more, language was not made for us to 
recreate it freely each, and every, time we use it, unless we 
don’t really want to communicate with others, but that seems 
to be the very purpose of the creation of language: 
Communication. 
What is meant here is that the only way to point at the 
Socrates we have in our Inner Reality with exclusivity and 
for eternity is the vector, but our language does not accept it, 
even because we would have to do a similar thing to counting 
grains of the bunch we see before uttering heap (Pinheiro, 
2016b): We would have to find out what number he got in 
the NDD before saying any sentence involving his name. 
Can you see how things connect? 
No, no, and no. In this case, the reasons to adopt Socrates 
or Plato’s Teacher as a handle are different from those we 
had to adopt heap for both one grain over the table and a 
huge dune: There the reasons were laziness and some sort of 
common set of characteristics we can all identify, and 
therefore our capacity of analysing and then synthesizing 
things. Here it is because we want to quickly communicate 
the message that connects to that Socrates we have in mind 
and the message is way more important than guaranteeing 
that the right Socrates is picked by the other as we try to pass 
it. If clarifications are needed, it is assumed that the other 
person will ask questions, so that communication will 
eventually occur. 
In any hypothesis, the main affliction of the individual 
who speaks is relaying the message, not having Socrates 
perfectly identified as they say it. It is as if our emotions call 
for that, basically. With heap, the message is not important, 
what seems to be important is pointing at the object in front 
of us: That is what is mandatory. That is where our affliction 
lies when we use the sigmatoid heap. Different reasons, 
same decision: A bit of vagueness is actually acceptable. In 
this case, the vagueness involved may not come across as a 
pleasant thing, and that is another difference we have here. 
Saying heap felt good: We are saving speech, we are trying 
to share that feeling, of being able to put all those 
characteristics together in a sigmatoid, something like a 
puzzle we all solved, and we are also trying to share the 
feeling of reward for having solved it. In the case involving 
Socrates, we feel pain: It is a shame that we cannot get 
everyone to select precisely our Socrates as we speak, but we 
are grateful for having a language, and those who we try to 
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communicate with can simply ask questions to get there. We 
will relax after they pick the same Socrates or something. 
We then either accept the essence of the world objects we 
try to point at, like they are a bit vague, or we accept our own 
will, of having things a bit blurred in order to have a lighter 
life, and therefore in order to have more fun. In one case, we 
accept the limitations of the tool we created, language, and, 
in the other, we go as far as we can go with it: Oh, we can 
stretch it to the point of fitting several items, which may 
seem to have very distinct nature, in one sigmatoid (one 
grain over a table, gazillions of grains of sand in the beach, 
etc.). 
3. Conclusions 
We end up noticing that our language has specifiers and 
synthetisers: Expressions that appear because we are trying 
to guarantee that the person who hears us picks exactly the 
same image we have in our Inner Reality when trying to 
communicate with them (specifiers) or because we have 
solved a sort of puzzle after analysing world objects in order 
to put common and subtle characteristics together 
(synthetisers).  
Vagueness seems to be an actual feature of some 
specifiers and also of some synthetisers: When we say heap, 
we assign a huge set of world objects to our assertion, so that 
if the person who listens to us ever picks the right world 
object, they are really good listeners, basically, so perhaps 
they know us quite well. Heap would be a synthetiser (a 
concentrator of senses). Socrates would be a specifier (we 
are trying to specify things as much as we can, we are trying 
to refer to things that we think are unique in terms of the 
world object we see in our Inner Reality when trying to 
communicate with others). 
To guarantee that our listener picks exactly the same 
human being we have in our Inner Reality when we speak, 
we would probably have to use DNA databases, since we 
have decided, as a race, that that is the only way to succeed 
when we are selecting the person we have in our Inner 
Reality with no mistake.  
To transfer that to human discourse, we would have to use 
a vector in place of a sigmatoid when trying to communicate 
with others, so that Socrates would be replaced with perhaps 
(Socrates, database entry number XXX). Doing this would 
imply finishing with the vagueness of the specifier, no 
doubts about it, but would also imply that we would have to 
know the DNA of everyone we refer to as we do that: It 
seems that we fell into the same trap we fell when trying to 
count grains of sand (The Sorites, numberphiles).  
In the end, what we want is communicating with others in 
an effective manner. It may be that saying Socrates does not 
always equate effective communication, but going to a 
database and finding out his DNA number seems to be 
something that would complicate things in an even worse, 
and probably unwanted, way.  
It seems that we think that solving puzzles is pleasant, so 
that using synthetisers is a pleasant thing: We were able to 
analyse something, extract a list of features, then analyse 
other items, extract their list of features, and finally put 
common features together to come up with this sort of 
expression.  
We feel happy when we can use those: Heap is a grain 
over a table, and it is also a huge dune in the beach. 
We write a poem and the readers are left to wonder: Wow, 
how magical! What they actually meant was a heap of 
nothing… .  
Human beings like arts, so that they feel enchanted with 
the possibility of playing with the sigmatoids. 
We feel pain when our Inner Reality does not point at the 
same Socrates the person who tries to communicate with us 
picked in their Inner Reality, but we know we can always ask 
for clarifications, and then refine our selection based on the 
answers we get.  
Just like with the sigmatoids and the lexicon, we will 
always have human beings who are not yet enrolled in our 
databases of DNA samples, and we do need to refer to those 
in our discourse. If nothing else, human beings from the past, 
when we did not have such techniques, can never appear in 
our discourse if we impose a rule that says that we must use a 
vector when referring to them, and this vector must contain 
their number in the DNA databases.  
We live in a 3D world, but our sigmatoids, when 
appearing on paper, belong to a 2D world, so that it should be 
impossible to describe with perfection what we experience in 
reality by means of our language. 
When we speak, our sigmatoids acquire a close-to-3D 
feeling, so that it should be more likely that we pick the same 
world object when we are using verbal communication. We 
can then, for instance, use our knowledge about the person 
who speaks to get to the right images in our Inner Reality. 
Vectors were a solution in what comes to movies and IT, 
so that they could also be a solution in what comes to 
communication in general: The best way to translate things 
from the 3D world into the 2D one.  
We would always have to accept and deal with vagueness, 
however, even if that happens only in what regards human 
beings who are not yet in our databases or sigmatoids that are 
still going through the process of having their lexicon entry 
refined.  
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